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I.  INTRODUCTION 
―Toa kitu kidogo‖ or ―give a little something‖ is often heard in East Africa, 
where bribes are commonplace.  From a traffic stop to picking up a package at the 
customs window in the post office, individuals can expect to add on a few shillings 
or francs for the ―cost of doing business.‖  But corruption has far darker 
consequences; it erodes the social fabric of a society, stifling its opportunities for 
growth, dissolving faith in the government, and preventing substantive rule of law 
and good governance.  Corruption, defined broadly, conveys a lack of accountability 
for government decisions, consequences for illegal actions, or a fair justice system.  
Through various anti-corruption measures, countries struggle in their own fight 
against the negative consequences of corruption.  This paper will examine the 
definition and measurements of corruption, the problem of corruption in the context 
of three East African nations (Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, and 
Rwanda), the anti-corruption techniques utilized in each country, and if those 
techniques have been effective.  
Each of the three countries has adopted various pieces of anti-corruption 
legislation and, to various degrees of effectiveness, implemented the laws.  But 
corruption remains a significant barrier to development and comes with significant 
economic and social costs.  While the focus of this paper will be the adequacy of the 
legal and administrative measures against corruption, it must be recognized that 
corruption cannot be fought on a purely legal level.  A country‘s history, political 
establishment, civil society, and economic inequalities are all factors in the breadth 
and depth of corruption and the effects on society.  There is no exact formula to 
eliminate corruption, but rather it is specific to each country and requires a holistic 
approach.   
II.  CORRUPTION 
A.  What is Corruption? 
Corruption can be defined as the impairment of integrity or the inducement to 
wrong by improper or illegal means.1  It is public officials misusing or abusing their 
power for personal gain.  Corruption manifests itself in many forms: bribing a 
policeman to avoid arrest, a politician persuading voters with the promise of future 
benefits, or a Member of Parliament (MP) skimming off public funds for his own 
gain are just a few examples.  ―Grand corruption‖ involves corruption of the 
decision-makers—the senior-level officials in a government, MPs, and heads of 
state.  ―Petty corruption‖ involves local level officials, including police officers, 
immigration officers, and district officials.2  Corruption is evidence of a lack of 
accountability within the public sector of a country and, therefore, the presence of 
corruption is significantly tied to the absence of the rule of law in a given country.   
                                                          
 1 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/corruption (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
 2 George Moody-Stuart, The Costs of Grand Corruption, 4 ECON. REFORM TODAY 19, 19 
(1996). 
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Scholars argue that corruptive practices, specifically those rampant in East 
Africa, are not a native endemic but rather a symptom of post-colonialism.3  Under 
colonization, arbitrary borders were used to divide up the colonies to ease the 
colonial powers‘ burden of ruling over the local population, thus forming countries 
of ethnic groups that had co-existed autonomously.  During the decolonization 
process, European powers marginalized Africans and worked closely with those 
anointed by the colonial powers to be the new ruling elite.  Unfortunately, those 
groups were often chosen based on how much the Europeans would benefit, not in 
the interests of the African people.4  By the 1970s, African governments, including 
those in the East African states of Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania 
(―Tanzania‖), and Rwanda, were in their infant stages.  Most African leaders had 
failed to develop adequate structures to provide basic social services to their people, 
such as education, health care, or access to electricity.5  Instead, military 
dictatorships and strong police forces developed in many countries.  Resources were 
exploited to benefit the ruling elite and thus corrupt patrimonial political and 
economic systems were formed.  
As well as choosing a new form of government, the new African governments 
were tasked with developing a national economy.  Many of the new legislators 
believed that rapid economic growth and development could only be achieved 
through a one-party system, as the multi-party democracies in the West encouraged 
polarization of already existing fragile or non-existent alliances between tribes or 
ethnicities.6  Additionally, the type of economy chosen by many of the new countries 
involved very high levels of government control over the allocation of resources and 
almost all economic activities.7  
One of the results of the government‘s control over the economy was that the 
public sector grew rapidly while private sector growth was marginalized.  Much of 
the new nations‘ resources were allocated at the will of the ruling elite.  Private 
investors and entrepreneurs had little incentive to develop business, and the 
framework of the new government intentionally or inadvertently stifled any real 
economic growth and development.8  Corruption was able to flourish under the post-
colonial systems, with a lack of adequately developed laws and institutions, 
patronage, abuse of political power, misuse of public funds, and bribery becoming 
the status quo.9     
                                                          
 3 John Mukum Mbaku, Corruption as an Important Post-Independence Institution in 
Africa, in CORRUPTION AND THE CRISIS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN AFRICA 16, 16-17 (John 
Mukum Mbaku ed., 1998). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 19. 
 7 Id. at 20. 
 8 Id. at 23-24. 
 9 Id. at 27. 
4 IN THE BALANCE [Vol. 1:1 
 
B.  Three Bases of Corruption  
The problem of corruption can be viewed through three lenses: economic, 
cultural, and political.10  These lenses could also be considered ways to view the 
causes of corruption as they are always working together in some fashion.   Being 
able to untangle the three dimensions of corruption in the context of any one specific 
country is a critical first step in forming a comprehensive plan to preventing 
corruption.11  Economic inequalities, the culture of bribery, and the strength or 
absence of democratic structure are examples of how deeply rooted underlying 
factors play a role in the level of corruption.   
A scarcity of resources and ineffective government control make corruption an 
easy way to supplement one‘s income.12  Developing countries that have limited 
resources also often have large economic gaps between the few super-wealthy and 
the majority who live day-to-day.  Many times public servants, such as police 
officers and immigration officers, find themselves in a position where they are not 
making enough to provide for their families with their government salaries.  
Therefore, paying bribes to civil servants to avoid a traffic ticket, or to move a visa 
application to the top of the pile, are common occurrences.13  But economic 
corruption is not limited to the developing world.  For example, over the last few 
years, Siemens, a German manufacturing giant, has been under investigation for 
numerous counts of corruption and bribery, from paying bribes to employees of an 
Italian client to under the table dealings with officials from the Argentine 
government.14  In fact the investigations have led to charges in the United States 
against eight Siemens executives for paying over $100 million in bribes to the 
Argentine government officials to win a $1 billion dollar contract.15  Corruption for 
economic gain is present in every society. 
Culture can add a layer of complexity to the issue because what is considered 
inappropriate bribery in one culture may be a very traditional and acceptable 
exchange of gifts, signifying that a deal has been made, in another.16  Other social 
factors, ―including the cultural basis of socioeconomic and political organizations, 
                                                          
 10 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND REFORMS 4-5 (1999).  
 11 Id. 
 12 See Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie & Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, The Political, Economic, and 
Cultural Bases of Corruption in Africa, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: 
LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES 40, 45 (Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr., & Bornwell C. 
Chikulo eds., Palgrave, 2000). 
 13 Interview with Lusajo Mwamakula, Former Police Officer, Moshi Municipality, Moshi, 
Tanzania (July 26, 2011). 
 14 Neil De Jour, The Bribery Scandal at Siemans AG, FOCUS (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://www.focus.com/briefs/bribery-scandal-siemens-ag/; Edward Wyatt, Former Siemans 
Executives are Charged with Bribery, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/12/14/business/global/former-siemens-executives-charged-withbribery.html?scp=1&sq= 
former%20siemens%20executives%20charged%20with%20bribery&st=cse. 
 15 U.S. Charges Siemens Executives with Bribery, TRUSTLAW.ORG (Dec. 13, 2011, 11:53 
PM), http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/us-charges-siemens-executives-with-bribery. 
 16 DANIEL ALTMAN, CONNECTED: 24 HOURS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 114-15 (2007). 
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pressures from the extended family and friends, and the lack of distinction between 
personal and private property‖ all add to the problem of corruption.17 
Political corruption has plagued countries all over the world, but is particularly 
prevalent in East Africa where the democracies are relatively young and often 
dominated by one political party.  Imposing undue influence on voters, rewarding 
supporters through patronage, and exploiting power for personal gain at the expense 
of the electorate are common acts of corruption.18  Regardless of the type of 
corruption, empirical evidence has proven the negative effects of corruption on a 
society.19  The value of having effective anti-corruption mechanisms in place is 
undisputed.20  
C.  Measures of Corruption 
Corruption lends itself to measurement more readily than the rule of law, but it is 
not without its own set of challenges.  First, corruption can be manifested in an 
infinite number of acts: misuse of public funds, taking bribes, and election tampering 
are just a few examples.  Second, the specific acts are hard to measure because they 
too often go unreported.  Third, if the data is being collected through government 
organizations, it is hard to imagine there is no bias or pressure to underreport (if at 
all).  Fortunately, there are a number of existing indexes that attempt to measure 
levels of corruption all over the world.   
Transparency International (―TI‖) produces the best-known measure of 
corruption, the Corruption Perceptions Index (―CPI‖).  The CPI ranks countries 
based on the perceptions of how corrupt their public sector is thought to be.  The 
index is compiled from corruption-related data collected from the countries, experts 
living and working in each country, and other polls.21  The CPI is based on 
perceptions because it assumes that since corruption is illegal and often unreported, 
accurate data of the levels of corruption would be unreliable and nearly impossible to 
gather.22  The CPI assigns countries a score from 0 to 10, with 0 being very corrupt 
and 10 being very clean and free of corruption.23  
The World Bank produces the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(―WBGI‖) each year in an attempt to quantify the six concepts of governance by 
measuring the perceptions of experts and citizens.24  The score for each country on 
                                                          
 17 Osei-Hwedie & Osei-Hwedie, supra note 12, at 41. 
 18 ALTMAN, supra note 16, at 119. 
 19 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 4-5. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://cpi.trans 
parency.org/cpi2011/in_detail/#myAnchor1 (last visited Jan. 31, 2012).  The CPI only 
includes countries if there are three or more sources of data for the country.   
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues 4-7 (The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 5430, 2010), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ 
WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2010/09/24/000158349_20100924120727/Rendered/PDF/WPS
5430.pdf?cid=EAP_GACGovHubNewsletterEN_M_EXT. 
6 IN THE BALANCE [Vol. 1:1 
 
―control of corruption‖ is a composite score based on the ―perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as ‗capture‘ of the state by elites and private interests.‖25  
The rank assigned to each country is between 0 (lowest level of ―control of 
corruption‖) and 100 (highest level of ―control of corruption‖).26  
Regionally, a collaborative effort among national chapters of TI, the Association 
Burundaise Des Consommateurs (AUBCO) from Burundi, and the Concern for 
Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDia) from Tanzania produce the East African 
Bribery Index (―EABI‖).27  The EABI measures the prevalence of bribery within 
each of the five East African countries, as well as breaking it down by public and 
private institution within each country.  The data is collected by a random sampling 
of households throughout all administrative regions of each country, asking 
individuals to name the public or private institution where they were required to pay 
the bribe or where the bribe was a condition to service, and whether or not service 
was given upon payment of the bribe or refusal to pay the bribe.28  The measure of 
prevalence of bribery in the country is the likelihood that an individual will have to 
pay a bribe to access services at the national level.29 
D.  Consequences of Corruption  
It seems remiss to discuss the causes of corruption and mechanisms to control 
corruption without briefly covering a few of the most important consequences of 
corruption.  Corruption has a negative effect on the societies in which it exists in a 
number of ways.   
Corruption is linked to weak economies, though whether corruption is the cause 
is extremely difficult to prove.  It is a factor for businesses from wealthy countries 
consider when deciding whether to invest or expand into a new country.  Companies 
are often asked to pay bribes to numerous government officials during the initial 
stages of investment, thereby supporting corruption, or to decide against the 
opportunity, hurting the economy by not investing at all.  The economic 
consequences include: bureaucratic corruption hurting small businesses in the 
domestic economy, discouraging foreign investment, and negatively affecting the 
economic growth rate of a country.30  International aid is not immune to the 
problems of corruption, as it too can end up in the wrong hands when politicians use 
                                                          
 25 Id. 
 26 The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Control of Corruption, THE WORLD BANK, 
available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
 27 Member Profile: ABUCO—Consumers Association of Burundi, CONSUMERS 
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.consumersinternational.org/our-members/member-directory/AB 
UCO%20-%20Consumers%20Association%20of%20Burundi%20-%20Association%20Buru 
ndaise%20des%20Consommateurs (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
 28 See generally The East African Bribery Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2011), 
available at http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2011/201 
1_10_20_east_african_bribery_index_2011. 
 29 Id. at 1. 
 30 Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, Minor 
Annoyance, or Major Obstacle? 8-11 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 2048, 1999), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=604923. 
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money for personal gain instead of pumping it into their economy, creating jobs and 
raising incomes for nationals.31  ―The fruits of corruption provide another motivation 
for repression and resistance to change.‖32  
The costs are not just economic. When allocating resources for public 
investment, corrupt government officials choose projects that can be manipulated or 
have a higher likelihood of kickbacks, regardless of whether or not they have a high 
social value.33  Social services suffer from lack of funds while the politicians and 
public officials line their pockets with payouts.  In September 2011, in the midst of a 
drought affecting millions of Kenyans, a string of corruption scandals were 
uncovered that accounted for tens of millions of dollars.34  The politicians who are 
using patronage and corruption for personal gain and to maintain power have no 
motivation to fix broken public services or improve the status quo for the millions of 
average citizens.  Corruption poses a variety of problems to countries, but so far the 
attempts to prevent corruption and establish rule of law have had limited success.    
III.  KENYA 
A.  Post-Colonial History 
Kenya was part of British East Africa during colonization.  The ethnic make-up 
of the country was (and still is) dominated by a handful of groups: the Kikuyu, the 
Kalenjin, the Luo and the Luhya.35  During colonization, the British systematically 
took the most fertile farmland and gave it to their white settlers for cultivation, 
mainly for coffee.  Incidentally, since most of the best land was in the Rift Valley 
and central highlands, which were home to the Kikuyu and Kalenjin people; these 
two groups suffered more than most.  Jomo Kenyatta was a leader of the Kikuyu and 
instrumental in the ―Mau Mau‖ Rebellion, a Kikuyu uprising against the colonizers 
that marked the beginning of the fight for independence, 36 which was achieved   on 
December 12, 1963.37   
Kenyatta became the first President of Kenya, representing the Kenya African 
National Union party (KANU), which was compromised of the Kikuyu people and 
few other ethnic groups.  During the 1960s, there were two opposition parties, one 
led by the Luo and the other by a coalition of smaller ethnic groups, but both were 
                                                          
 31 ALTMAN, supra note 16, at 121. 
 32 Id. at 119.  
 33 Wei, supra note 30, at 11-13. 
 34 String of Corruption Scandals Leaves Kenya Government Without Enough Money to 
Feed Starving, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2011), available at http://www.washington 
post.com/world/africa/string-of-corruption-scandals-leaves-kenya-government-without-
enough-money-to-feed-starving/2011/09/08/gIQAAdZACK_story.html [hereinafter String of 
Corruption]. 
 35 Kenya Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2962.htm (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
 36 GUY ARNOLD, A GUIDE TO AFRICAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 82 
(2001). 
 37 Kenya Fact Sheet, supra note 35. 
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dissolved by 1966.38  By that time, Kenya was unofficially a one-party state, made 
official by an amendment to the constitution in 1982.39   
After Kenyatta‘s death in 1978, the Presidency changed ethnic groups, but not 
political parties.  President Daniel Arap Moi, who was a Kalenjin, took over the seat.  
Presumably, international and public pressures mounted to open the political system 
to opposition, and in 1991 the one-party state was repealed and a multi-party system 
was put in place.  The first multi-party elections were held in 1992 with little effect 
on KANU‘s political stronghold.  It was not until the 1997 elections that KANU 
needed to build coalitions with minority ethnic groups to retain the majority.40  From 
1978 until 2002, Moi‘s administration became synonymous with corruption and 
patronage politics. 41 
The 2002 presidential election was critical in Kenyan‘s politics.  Shortly before 
the December vote, a new opposition coalition party formed called the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC).  Despite being a relatively loosely organized coalition 
(as seen by its dissolution shortly after conception), it was a powerful statement that 
the Kenyan people wanted a change from the corrupt rule of KANU.42  The NARC 
candidate, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu from the Rift Valley, defeated Moi at the voting 
booth in what international observers considered to be a free and fair election.43 
By 2005, during the process of drafting a new constitution, the fractions among 
various alliances in NARC began splitting the party.  The division led to two 
political parties vying for the Presidency in 2007—the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU).  Ralia Odinga, a Luo 
who was once Kibaki‘s ally, led ODM and the PNU remained the party of President 
Kibaki and his supporters.  The majority of PNU supporters are Kikuyu, while ODM 
supporters are comprised of supporters representing nearly all the other ethnic 
groups.44  
The December 27, 2007 elections for the Presidency were tainted with 
allegations of voter fraud, irregularities in vote counting, and, once Kibaki was 
announced as the winner, outbreaks of violence.  Frustrations against what voters 
saw as a corrupt political machine manifested in violence that left 1,300 Kenyans 
dead and over 500,000 displaced by the violence in Nairobi, the capital city.  After 
the riots were stopped, a power-sharing deal was brokered with the help of former 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan.  The deal was signed in 2008, giving 
the Presidency to Kibaki and a newly-created Prime Minister position to Odinga.45 
Throughout the tumultuous elections and power-sharing negotiations, the task of 
drafting a new constitution continued.  It focused on reforms to the constitutional 
                                                          
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Gladwell Otieno, The NARC’s Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya, 14 AFR. SECURITY REV. 
4, 1 (2005). 
 42 Kenya Fact Sheet, supra note 35. 
 43 Otieno, supra note 41, at 1. 
 44 Kenya Fact Sheet, supra note 35. 
 45 Id. 
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structure, electoral system, land allocation and rights, and institutional capacity 
building, as well as addressing government accountability for corruption and 
political violence.  The new constitution was approved by popular vote on August 4, 
2010.46 
The Kenyan economy has mirrored the troubled political scene.  After periods of 
high growth immediately after independence, economic growth slowed down 
significantly in the 1980s and 1990s.   Since 1995 it has seen positive, albeit small, 
growth.  It was picking up speed leading up to the 2007 elections, but political 
violence severely disrupted the progress.47 
B.  Corruption in Kenya 
The 1990s in Kenya saw one of the biggest grand corruption schemes come to 
light.  The Goldenberg Scandal, an export compensation scheme, was exposed;an 
estimated $650 million USD was embezzled.48   An unrelated study on corruption 
and laxity cost Kenya over $6.4 billion between 1991 and 1997.49  The political 
scene was certainly ripe for the argument that corruption was out of control and 
needed to be addressed, setting the stage for Kibaki to win the Presidency in 2002.   
Kibaki and NARC promised to crack down on corruption.  A Commission of 
Inquiry was formed to investigate the Goldenberg Scandal and legislation was 
passed to form various institutions to safeguard against corruption, including the 
Public Office Ethics Act, the Commission of Inquiry into Irregular and Illegal 
Allocation of Public Lands, and the Pending Bills Verification and Validation 
Committee.  But the NARC government and Kibaki fell short on many of these lofty 
goals.  The Commission of Inquiry on the Goldenberg Scandal produced a thorough 
investigation but lacked follow-through to bring those most responsible to justice.50  
In many ways, the old ways of corruption and patronage politics under Moi and 
KANU had not changed.51 
In 2006 there were two major corruption scandals that broke, one regarding 
money laundering and the other a tax evasion scandal in the banking system.  The 
incidents were linked to government officials, including three senior-level 
government ministers, one of which was re-appointed after the allegations.52  Around 
the same time, John Githongo, the well-respected former director for Transparency 
International Kenya who had been appointed by Kibaki to lead the fight against 
corruption, resigned and relocated to England, stating that he was disappointed and 
disillusioned by the lack of commitment in the Kibaki government to fight 
corruption.53  The problem of corruption only worsened in 2007 with post-election 
                                                          
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Otieno, supra note 41, at 2. 
 49 Policy Brief, A Survey of Seven Years of Waste, CENTRE FOR GOV‘T AND DEV. (Feb. 
2001); Otieno supra note 41, at 4.  
 50 Otieno, supra note 41, at 2-5. 
 51 Id. at 5.  
 52 Id. 
 53 Alex Perry & Laura Blue, The Demons That Still Haunt Africa 35, TIME (Jan. 10, 2008), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1702349,00.html. 
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violence and allegations of serious errors in vote counting, some districts reporting 
more votes than they had voters.54 
C.  Anti-Corruption Efforts  
Anti-corruption legislation began in 1956, when Kenya was still a British colony, 
with the Prevention of Corruption Act, which remained in effect until May 2003.55  
The Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA) enforced the Act until it was 
disbanded in 2000 after a ruling from the High Court declared the KACA 
undermined the authority of the Attorney General‘s office.56  The Anti-Corruption 
Police Unit took on the role of investigation and prosecuting corruption from August 
2001 until it was also replaced by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) 
in May 2003.57 
In line with the 2002 election of Kibaki and his promise to focus on the fight 
against corruption, 2003 was a big year for anti-corruption legislation.  Many of the 
good governance efforts were tied to the Economic Recovery Strategy in 2003, 
including two key pieces of legislation: the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes 
Act (ACECA) and the Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA).58  The ACECA created the 
Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, which was responsible for investigating 
corruption and economic crimes and conducting public education on corruption.59  
The POEA provides codes of conduct for all public officers and compels all 
government officials to declare their wealth, including the assets of their spouse and 
dependents.60  This legislation was seen as a solid effort for reform and as a result 
some institutions that had severed ties because of corruption in the past, like the 
International Monetary Fund, began working with Kenya again.61  Other pieces of 
legislation passed by Kibaki and NARC during his presidential term included the 
Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005, the Public Procurement Regulations 
(2006), and the Witness Protection Act, 2006.62  
After the new constitution passed, the KACC was restructured to conform to 
stronger regulations against corruption and renamed the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission (EACC).63  The EACC reports investigations and traces assets, 
conducts litigation and recovery of public and unexplained assets, implements 
corruption prevention activities, and assists in institutional capacity building.64  
                                                          
 54 Otieno, supra note 41, at 5. 
 55 ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION, http://www.kacc.go.ke/default.asp?pageid 
=2 (last visited Dec. 5, 2011). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION, supra note 55; Otieno, supra note 41, at 2.   
 59 Otieno, supra note 41, at 1. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION, supra note 55.  
 63 Id. 
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There has also been specialty courts established within the Kenyan court system to 
deal with corruption cases.65 
D.  Status of Corruption  
According to the EABI 2011, an individual has a 28.8% chance of having to pay 
a bribe in order to access services at the national level (i.e., police, immigration and 
customs, tax revenue agency).  This is a slight improvement from 2010 when there 
was a 31.9% chance of encountering a bribe.66  The WBGI score for ―control of 
corruption‖ has increased from 14.63 to 18.66, showing modest gains in the 
perception that corruption is under control in Kenya.67  The CPI score for Kenya in 
2011 is 2.2 (out of 10), a gain from 2.1 in 2000.68  All scores indicate improvements, 
even if very modest. 
Evidence that is equally if not more powerful than the statistics is current news 
stories of corruption within the Kenyan government.  In 2011, there were reports of 
missing education funds and missing funds for food aid for northern Kenyans 
suffering from the East African drought.69   Political corruption from post-election 
violence in 2007 is continuing to play out as six government officials were indicted 
by the International Criminal Court in 2011 for inciting the riots caused by alleged 
political corruption in the December 2007 presidential election.70  While the statistics 
may show slight improvements for the fight against corruption in Kenya, it remains a 
significant plague on the country. 
IV.  UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 
A.  Post-Colonial History 
Tanganyika (the mainland of Tanzania) was a German colony until the end of 
World War I when it became part of British East Africa.  Tanganyika became fully 
independent on December 9, 1961, and Julius Nyerere, the leader of the Tanganyika 
Africa National Union party (TANU), became the first President.  Three years later 
on April 26, 1964, it joined with Zanzibar to become the United Republic of 
Tanzania.71  The political parties from Tanganyika and Zanzibar also merged in 1977 
to become Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), known as the Revolutionary party.72  
                                                          
 65 Special Courts for Corruption Cases, U4.NO, http://www.u4.no/publications/special-
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Nyerere, affectionately called ―Mwalimu‖ (the Kiswahili word for teacher), was one 
of only a few Tanzanians who had been educated abroad during colonization.  That 
education greatly influenced his political and economic ideology.  From 
independence, Nyerere‘s socialist form of government encouraged a strong national 
identity among the people, taking priority over ethnic or religious differences.73 
Nyerere‘s policy of socialism meant that CCM and the state were effectively one 
and the same.  While the cohesive vision of having just one ―people‖ has served well 
(as seen by Tanzania‘s political stability through the years), it did not do any favors 
to economic growth or prevention of corruption.  Nyerere stepped down from the 
Presidency in 1985 and was followed by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi (also from 
the CMM party).74   Mwinyi was succeeded by President Benjamin Mpaka in 1995 
until 2005.  In 2005, President Jakaya Kikwete won the presidency.  While there 
have been four multi-party elections in Tanzania‘s history, CCM has handily 
remained in control of virtually all aspects of the government.75  In the most recent 
election in 2010, opposition parties began to pose legitimate threats to the CCM 
stronghold.  The opposition party Chadema won a number of seats in the Parliament 
and the presidential candidate for Chadema, Willibrod Slaa, won 27% of the vote.76 
Nyerere‘s original policies of socialism, sometimes referred to as the ―Great 
Socialist Experiment,‖ were largely a failure when it came to a developing economic 
system.77  By 1986 Tanzania began to liberalize their system and allow for open 
markets, but growth was slow.  Even in recent years, about 30% of the country‘s 
budget comes from donor aid.  Tanzania has made efforts to reform the economy and 
encourage investment—particularly foreign direct investment—but the legacy of 
socialism, along with complaints of a hostile bureaucracy and a weak judiciary, does 
not help.78  
B.  Corruption in Tanzania 
During the 2005 presidential campaign, Kikwete ran on an anti-corruption 
platform, pledging to commit to the fight against corruption.  Unfortunately, a quick 
overview of the last several years does not show evidence of any implementation of 
his promise.79  In 2008, three grand corruption scandals were exposed.  First, the 
Governor of Tanzania‘s Central Bank, Daudi Ballali, was fired after an international 
internal audit discovered over $100 million USD was paid to local companies, some 
of which did not even exist, without consideration.80  Next, the former Prime 
Minister, Edward Lowassa, along with two other senior-level ministers in the 
government, resigned after allegations that they awarded a large-sum contract to a 
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non-existent electricity company in the United States.81  Lastly, in April 2008, 
British and Saudi governments linked BAE, a British arms manufacturer, to 
commission payments (or bribes) given to individuals in Tanzania to help lobby for 
the multi-million dollar deal.   The scandal allegedly involved the former Attorney 
General, Andrew Chenge, but Chenge resigned before any charges were brought.82  
The attempts at holding those accountable have been less than satisfactory to 
many Tanzanians.  In October 2010, former Finance Minister Basil Mramba, 
Ministry‘s Permanent Secretary Gray Mgonja, and former Energy and Minerals 
Minister Daniel Yona, all faced corruption charges in court, but the substance of any 
punishment or follow-through is yet to been seen.83  During the 2010 elections, 
corruption was an enormous issue facing the candidates.   Kikwete was forced to 
defend the little progress being made while the opposition accused the government 
of settling for prosecuting scapegoats as the senior officials were allowed to resign 
and avoid accountability.84  The 2010 Revenue Watch Index placed Tanzania at the 
bottom of the list in terms of transparency regarding mining deals and mineral 
revenues.85   
C.  Anti-Corruption Efforts 
The Prevention of Corruption Ordinance was the first piece of anti-corruption 
legislation in Tanzania and was enacted in 1958.  In 1971, it became the Prevention 
of Corruption Act (PCA).86   The PCA established the Anti-Corruption Squad in 
1975 and its responsibilities included investigating and prosecuting offences, taking 
measure to prevent corruption, and advising the government on mechanisms to 
combat corruption.87  In 1991, the Anti-Corruption Squad became the Prevention of 
Corruption Bureau (PCB).  Until 1995, the PCA was the sole piece of anti-
corruption legislation and the PCB was the sole enforcement mechanism.88 
In an attempt to create a comprehensive plan to fight corruption, President 
Mpaka‘s administration compiled the ―Warioba Report,‖ which would act as a 
driving agent for the anti-corruption strategy for years.89  From the ―Warioba 
Report‖ the first National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) was 
adopted in 1999.90  The NACSAP included measures to remove corrupt leaders, 
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strengthen the Prevention of Corruption Bureau, appoint a minister of good 
governance, and establish a Commission of Ethics.91 
In May 2008, the Enhanced National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 
(NACSAP II) was launched, aiming to encourage partnerships between the 
government and the private sector, civil society and the media to assist in the fight 
against corruption.92   The institutions and legislation established and/or strengthened 
by the NASCAP and NACSAP II are: the Prevention and Combating of Corruption 
Bureau, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Ethics Secretariat, the 
Inspectorate of Ethics, the National Audit Office, the Commission for Human Rights 
and Good Governance, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, the Public 
Procurement Appeals Authority, the Good Governance Coordination Unit, and the 
Financial Intelligence Unit within the Ministry of Finance.93 
D.  Status of Corruption 
The efforts of the NACSAP and NACSAP II are paying off, but corruption 
remains a significant problem for the country.  The 2011 EABI score actually shows 
an increase in the prevalence of bribery from 2010 to 2011, with the percentage of 
likelihood in encountering a bribe when accessing public services having risen from 
26.8% to 31.6%.94  However, both the CPI score and WBGI show moderate 
improvements since 2000.  The CPI score has risen from 2.5 (2000) to 3 (2011) on a 
scale of 0 to 10 with 0 as most corrupt and 10 as very little corruption.95  The WBGI 
for ―control of corruption‖ scores Tanzania at 37.32 out of 100 in 2011, compared to 
14.63 in 2000.96 
Some of the issues in the fight against corruption in Tanzania are: insufficient 
enforcement, inadequate safeguards for whistle-blowers, limited public access to 
government official‘s records and public declarations, and a basic lack of power 
behind the strategy.97  President Kikwete has renewed his promise to fight 
corruption, starting this time with his own party, CCM.  He has stated that CCM will 
dismiss party members who are have been linked to corruption scandals.98  Until 
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now, a number of senior-level party leaders have maintained their top positions in 
the party even after allegations of corruption and resignations from government posts 
due to corruption accusations.  Only time will tell how serious Kikwete and CCM 
are about the commitment to cleanse the party of corruption (until now only one 
senior-level official has voluntarily left the party because of graft), and if their 
pledge to clean the party of corrupt officials will be effective for the next presidential 
campaign.99 
V.  RWANDA 
A.  Post-Colonial History 
As a colony, Rwanda was under Belgian rule from post-World War I until July 1, 
1962 when it became independent.100  Under colonial rule, Belgium instituted a 
―racialization‖ of the local population by issuing identity cards that associated a 
person with his ethnic group, mainly Hutu or Tutsi.101  The system began to create 
animosity between the two groups as the Belgians favored the Hutus.  After 
independence, Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu and leader of the Parti du Mouvement de 
l'Emancipation Hutu (Parmehutu) political party, became the first President of 
Rwanda.102  Kayibanda led a one-party government that instilled anti-Tutsi programs 
and was riddled with corruption scandals and inefficiency.  In 1972, the military took 
power by force and Major General Juvenal Habyarimana took over as President.  
Habyarimana abolished Parmehutu and formed the National Revolutionary 
Movement for Development (MRND).103 
Habyarimana‘s government remained anti-Tutsi and as a result many Tutsi fled 
to neighboring countries during both of the first two administrations.  After eighteen 
years in charge and without opposition, Habyarimana gave in to international and 
public pressures to turn the one-party state into a multi-party state.104  In October 
1990, the Tutsis living in exile formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and began 
to wage attacks on the Rwandan government and the MRND.  The fighting lasted 
over two years and ended briefly in 1992 with the Arusha Accords.105 
On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana‘s plane was shot down over Kigali, the 
capital city, and in Kigali violence erupted between the RPF and the Rwandan 
government.  The government was complicit in ordering the systematic killing of 
                                                          
 99 Id. 
 100 Rwanda Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id.; Parmehutu is translated into English as ―Party of the Hutu Emancipation 
Movement.‖  Rwanda: Political Parties, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Rwanda-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html#b (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2012). 
 103 Rwanda: Political Parties, supra note 102. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
16 IN THE BALANCE [Vol. 1:1 
 
any and all Tutsis and moderate Hutus.  Over the next four months, genocide ensued, 
taking the lives of over 800,000 Rwandans and displacing over two million.106   
On July 4, 1994, the RPF took control of Kigali and the genocide ended.  The 
effort to rebuild a nation began.  The RPF organized a coalition government called 
―The Broad Based Government of National Unity,‖ comprised of eight political 
parties, but outlawed MRND.107  Since 1994, the RPF has been the main political 
party and leader of the coalition government.  Paul Kagame of the RPF was elected 
to a seven-year term as the President of Rwanda on August 25, 2003 and was re-
elected in 2010 with 93% of the vote.108 There have been some allegations of 
suppression of opposition in 2003 when the transitional National Assembly 
dissolved the Democratic Republic Party and some of its members disappeared.  
More allegations came in 2010 during the presidential election with accusations of 
activities of oppression of opposition, including a murdered journalist, suppression 
of two newspapers, and murder of a senior political official in the Democratic Green 
Party.109 
The effects of the genocide are still felt as over 70,000 Rwandans live in 
neighboring countries and tens of thousands more are in the judicial system (either 
waiting for trial or serving a prison sentence) for genocide-related crimes.  But there 
has been significant recovery as well, with steady economic growth, progress in 
combating corruption, and transparency in banking reforms to encourage 
investment.110  
B.  Corruption in Rwanda 
Over the last ten to fifteen years, Rwanda has made significant progress in the 
fight against corruption, but it has not been eliminated.  The problem remains, 
particularly at the lower levels of administration.  A 2004 report from the 
Ombudsman‘s office, which is in charge of leading the anti-corruption strategy, 
showed 35% of corruption cases involved district leaders and their assistants, public 
fund embezzlements, selling of district‘s natural resources, mismanagement, and 
unauthorized bank withdrawals.111  In 2004 and 2005, approximately 300 police 
officers, including senior-level officers, were fired for corruption.  In 2005 and 2006, 
Kagame fired several senior-level officials accused of being involved in corruption 
and embezzlement.112 
Since the transition period after the genocide, the Rwandan government has 
remained aggressive in the fight against corruption.  Kagame leads a government 
that follows through on its promises to hold individuals accountable, no matter the 
ranking or reputation of the person.113 
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C.  Anti-Corruption Efforts  
There are four primary institutions that Rwanda has created to implement its anti-
corruption strategy.  The National Tender Board was formed in 1997 to manage and 
organize the public procurement process and implement the general public 
procurement policy on behalf of the government.114  The Anti-Corruption Unit 
within the Rwanda Revenue Authority has instituted a Code of Conduct, internal 
disciplinary measures, and a culture to promote integrity within the institution.115  
The Auditor‘s General‘s Office (OAG) was established in 1999 to provide audits of 
government adherence to fiscal controls.116 
Lastly and most recently, the Ombudsman‘s office was created in 2004 to 
monitor transparency and regulatory compliance in all government sectors and to 
expose fraud, corruption and malpractice.117  The multi-pronged approach to create 
more transparency and accountability is similar to the approaches employed by  
Kenya and Tanzania but the difference seems to be in the meaningful 
implementation.  The Chairperson for the Ombudsman‘s Office credited the progress 
to the removal of corrupt leaders, more training and education, and decentralizing 
the anti-corruption strategy.118 
D.  Status of Corruption 
Rwanda has shown unprecedented success in tackling the problem of corruption 
relative to other countries in the region.  In 2010, the likelihood of encountering a 
bribe in accessing public services was 6.6%.  In 2011, that percentage dropped to 
5.1%.119  Transparency International‘s CPI score in 2011 was 5, on a scale of 0 to 
10.120  The WBGI for ―control of corruption‖ scored Rwanda at 30.73 (out of 100) in 
2000, with significant improvement in 2011 at 70.81.121   
As a result of Rwanda‘s success in fighting corruption, there are few current 
news stories on corruption, and even fewer that are big enough to reach the scale of 
the grand corruption scandals seen in Kenya and Tanzania in recent years.  However, 
the incidents do exist.  In July 2011, an investigation led to the  prosecution of 223 
people, including senior government officials, for stealing public funds of $5 million 
USD.122  Because of their success fighting corruption, Rwanda‘s efforts are taking 
the next step in the fight against corruption and pushing the laws further to allow 
more mechanisms for recovering stolen assets.123   
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VI.  COMPARISONS WITHIN THE REGION  
A.  Scores Compared Across Countries 
While each country has proven unique in its fight against corruption, analyzing 
the scores across the region can provide a larger perspective on the status of 
corruption in East Africa.124  Table 1 makes the similarities and differences become 
more apparent.     
Table 1 
Country 
% of 
Bribery 
Prevalence 
2010125 
% of 
Bribery 
Prevalence 
2011126 
CPI Index 
(2000)127 
CPI 
Index 
(2011) 
WBGI – 
Control of 
Corruption 
(2000)128 
WBGI – 
Control of 
Corruption 
(2010)129 
Kenya 31.9% 28.8% 2.1 2.2 14.63 18.66 
Tanzania 26.8% 31.6% 2.5 3 14.63 37.32 
Rwanda 6.6% 5.1% N/A 5 30.73 70.81 
United 
States 
N/A N/A 7.8 7.1 92.68 85.65 
 
Rwanda leads the fight against corruption with the lowest levels of bribery 
(according to the EABI).  In the WBGI scores, Rwanda is closer to the United States 
than it is to either Tanzania or Kenya.
130
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Through discussions of history, politics, and economics, it is clear that there are 
many factors contributing to the scores of corruption.  According to the scores, 
Kenya appears to be struggling with corruption more than Tanzania and Rwanda, 
with less gain on both the CPI score and WBGI score.  However, Tanzania is the 
only country of the three whose prevalence of bribery has increased in the last year.  
Kenya and Tanzania, according to all three of the measures, are dealing with similar 
levels of corruption, while Rwanda has effectively dealt with the problem of 
corruption.   
B.  Possible Explanations for Similarities and Differences 
Just as there are a variety of factors that can be argued to cause corruption, there 
are numerous reasons for the differences between Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda and 
their past and current levels of corruption.  Some of the possibilities include the size 
of the country, the ethnic diversity of the population, the strength of the political 
parties, and the size of economic disparities.  Numerous factors also explain the 
success or failures of each country‘s anti-corruption programs, including the amount 
of political will and commitment, civic participation in the government, witness 
protections for those who report corruption, and faith (or lack thereof) in a system of 
accountability.  Equally as important to understanding the causes of corruption and 
factors effecting anti-corruption mechanisms is remembering the difficulties in 
measuring corruption.  Often, the public relies on the media to expose grand 
corruption scandals.  In both Kenya and Rwanda, Freedom House has listed the 
media outlets as ―not free,‖ meaning there exist government restraints in what can be 
reported.131  Exposure of corruption scandals and the extent of corruption throughout 
society is a critical step in combating the problem.  
There are observations that may help explain the differences between the three 
countries.  Kenya seems to be unique in its struggle of tribalism and patronage 
politics— particularly in comparison to Tanzania—thanks to Nyerere and his push 
for a national identity.  Kenya also suffers from a history of land rights issues during 
colonization that may have led to patronage in compensation immediately following 
independence.  Tanzania has been disadvantaged from both the legacy of socialism 
and extreme government involvement in the economy, as well as one dominant 
political party that governed without checks and balances since independence.  
Rwanda‘s tragic history certainly sets it apart.  The task of rebuilding a nation after 
genocide left no tolerance for corruption.  The zero tolerance was paired with a 
legitimate commitment from the government to hold those involved with corruption 
accountable, no matter the level of government involved.  The transparency and 
coalition building required for healing the nation after the genocide also served to 
prevent corruption from taking root in the new government. 
VII.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
A.  Background & Anti-Corruption Efforts 
The East African Community (EAC) was formed originally in 1967 and 
reinstituted in 1996.  The original members were Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, with 
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Rwanda and Burundi joining in 2007.132  The EAC was created to form 
comprehensive tariff regulations, ease the flow of people throughout the region, and 
improve regional infrastructure.133  The formation of meaningful policies and 
implementation of any policies has been slow, as some countries are apprehensive to 
opening their markets and becoming vulnerable, particularly with Kenya‘s 
dominating economy.134  The Customs Union and Common External Tariff was 
established in January 2005, but has yet to be implemented.135 
The East African Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities was formed on 
September 28, 2007 to provide comprehensive strategies to combat corruption in the 
region.136  Also relevant to the regional fight against corruption, the East African 
Business Council produced ―The State of Corporate Governance and Anti-
Corruption in East Africa Partner States,‖ attempting to set a starting point for the 
region to address problems of corruption as it affects business and economic 
growth.137 
B.  Implications 
As the plans for a unified East African Community move forward, resulting in 
fewer restrictions on imports and exports between countries, a more mobile 
workforce that can move throughout the region, and the possibility of a common 
currency, there are certainly many issues left to iron out.138  And given the 
differences on the control of corruption between Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, 
corruption should certainly be considered.  Rwanda may not have significant 
influence, being one of the smaller countries in the EAC, but its anti-corruption 
mechanisms and commitment to the fight against corruption are impressive.   
VIII.  THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The international community has had some success in influencing countries to 
prioritize good governance and anti-corruption commitments over the past decades.  
There are a number of ways in which the international community can continue to 
encourage good governance.  The international community can keep an active 
interest in tracking funds from international organizations to ensure they are used 
effectively.  Aid agencies can fund programs specifically directed at fighting 
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corruption, improving transparency 139  The corporate side of international business 
can assist by promoting policies internally that prohibit employees from paying 
bribes and establishing procedures to reports corruption.  The United Nation, World 
Bank, IMF and others can use international law to establish new international 
institutions for reform and oversight of corruption.140  Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda 
have all signed the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption, as well as the United Nations Conventions Against Corruption.141  
International pressures can help keep countries committed to establishing good 
governance, particularly through leading by example and keeping signatory 
countries accountable for anti-corruption conventions. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) influences borrower countries by 
holding that countries must comply with IMF regulations to borrow money.  In the 
past, the IMF has put pressure on both Kenya and Tanzania to institute reforms and 
show a commitment to fighting corruption in order to resume borrowing.142  The 
World Bank requires that countries sign a ―no-bribery‖ pledge as a pre-requisite to 
receive funds.  While the pledge may seem simply procedural, it can be used to 
impose sanctions and at least provides an upfront understanding that the World Bank 
has a zero-tolerance policy for corruption.143 
IX.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
―Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.‖144 This 
historical quote by Lord Acton in 1887 has been applied countless times over the last 
century.  The analysis of corruption in East Africa is another example of the 
statement‘s accuracy.  In Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, each unique history allowed 
an opportunity for a single political party to grab hold of the power over the state 
without viable opposition to keep the power in check, resulting in a flourishing 
culture of corruption.   
But more important than finding the historical root of corruption is determining 
which factors allow it to continue.  The biggest difference between Kenya and 
Tanzania (both countries that continue struggling with corruption on a large scale) 
and Rwanda is the commitment of the current government to good governance, 
transparency and accountability.  Each country will require a unique strategy to fight 
corruption and its particular causes in their society.  But certainly the strategy must 
be holistic in its approach, address both procedural and substantive mechanisms, and 
remain meaningful in its implementation.145  A successful anti-corruption plan 
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requires buy-in and political capital from all levels of the government, from the 
President‘s office to the district administrators.146  Serious approaches to tackle the 
problem of corruption must lay down realistic and measurable goals and not just 
empty promises of broad unattainable reform.147 
Local history, political will, institutional capacity, and the commitment to hold 
corrupt individuals accountable are all variables in the type of strategy and success 
of anti-corruption plans.  Hopefully this analysis of the history of corruption and 
politics in Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda provides some insight into the complexity 
of corruption and some factors that could explain various degrees of success of anti-
corruption strategies.  Corruption is a disease to development, both social and 
economic, and requires serious commitment to end.  But with dedication and 
political will, its damaging effects can be reduced. 
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